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PREFACE 
The preparation of an invited paper imposes a cost on the 
academic: although normally in his general field of interest, the 
assigned topic seldom coincides exactly with the subject of his 
current thinking and writing. Thus, the assignment entails a 
temporary shifting of mental gears. At the same time, the 
preparation of an invited paper presents the academic with an 
opportunity: the question he is asked to address normally is a 
matter of concern among those who deal with the real world and its 
attendant problems. Thus, he is challenged to make his work 
relevant to those concerns. For me the expected benefits of the 
opportunity exceed the expected costs of the effort, so you have 
before you an attempt to distill something of redeeming social 
value from my recent research. The nature of this forum leads me 
to depart from the usual academic style in two respects, however. 
First, the paper which follows is a mixture of academic research 
and personal point of view, not a detached, dispassionate analysis. 
Second, in the interests of clarity, I have not burdened my 
argument with the numerous qualifications which customarily 
accompany academic discussions. I am sure that my fellow 
participants will suggest the needed qualifications. 
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The assigned topic is "Control of the Bureaucracy. " By 
itself the phrase is neutral, but presumably it would not have 
been selected unless many political observers considered it a 
problem. In the popular media of course one commonly finds 
allusions to out of control (runaway) bureaucracy. And certainly 
academics too remark that the bureaucracy is not well-controlled, 
perhaps that it can not be well-controlled. In a widely-read 
recent book on the Presidency, for example, Stephen Hess contends 
that it is a mistake for modern presidents even to attempt to 
manage the bureaucracy -- in the sense of overseeing day-to- day 
bureaucratic operations.1 Instead Hess advocates a presidential 
role of agenda setting and policy (not managerial) decision­
making. Peter Woll writes that the emergence of the federal 
bureaucracy adds a fourth dimension to the constitutional separation 
of powers.
2 
His work attempts to come to grips with the 
bureaucracy' s place in that system. Samuel Huntington writes 
gloomily of the future of democratic assemblies in a world of 
inevitably larger and more powerful bureaucratic establishments.
3 
Well-meaning reformers often construe such discussions as rationales 
for institutional panaceas -- sunset and sunshine laws, zero-based 
budgeting, executive branch reorganization, etc. But I doubt that 
the cited authors view their work as justifications for reform 
movements. For it is one thing to note that the bureaucracy is an 
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important branch of the federal government, that it can develop and 
use political resources, that its expertise gives it an advantage 
in dealing with other branches of the government, and quite another 
thing to claim that the bureaucracy is out of control. In one 
sense that claim is true, but in another sense it is simply false. 
Too often, observers confuse themselves and others by shifting too 
easily between the two. 
The bureaucracy is not out of control. The Congress 
controls the bureaucracy, and the Congress gives us the kind of 
bureaucracy it wants. If some modern day Madison were to formulate 
a plan which would guarantee an efficient, effective, centrally 
directed bureaucracy, Congress would react with fear and loathing. 
To be sure, particular congressmen may wish to do away with 
particular agencies, but if the choice were between the existing 
bureaucratic world and the utopian bureaucratic world conjured 
up above, Congress would cast a near unanimous vote for the status 
quo. Despite its warts the parent loves the child. 
Obviously I am playing on ambiguities in the concept of 
"control. " In the first place many observers would distinguish 
between theoretical (i.e. formal or legal) control, and actual 
(i.e. politically feasible) control. As usual, the Constitution 
divides formal control over the bureaucracy between the president 
and Congress (and the Courts play a more important role than we 
often recognize). While nominally the head of a large part of 
the federal apparatus the president's actual authority is rather 
modest. Civil Service and advice and consent requirements 
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circumscribe his appointment powers. His personal agency, OMB, 
is indisputably powerful , but once matters escape its cl utches and 
get into the congressional arena, the president may appear to be 
a pitiful, helpless giant when confronted by renegade agencies. 
Lacking the rif le of the item veto the president can onl y threaten 
the cannon of the general veto, and denizens of Washington can 
judge when he does not dare f ire that cannon. Congress on the other 
hand has the f ormal power of lif e  and death over the bureaucracy. 
Congress can abolish an agency or reorganize it, change its 
jurisdiction or allow its program authority to lapse entirely, 
cut its appropriations and conduct embarrassing investigations. 
A hostile Congress unconcerned about the consequences of its actions 
could decimate the f ederal establishment. 
Of course, Congress seldom exercises its f ormal powers. 
Ideas such as sunset l aws and zero-based budgeting are little more 
than attempts to insure that existing congressional powers are 
used more frequently, or at least that their use is contemplated 
more f requently. Procedural changes alone are insuf f icient to 
increase control over the bureaucracy; to achieve their purpose 
such changes must also provide incentives to exercise that control. 4 
There is a second, more important ambiguity in the 
concept of "control." What kind of control do we want? Control 
f or what? Imagine a naval fleet in which each vessel is under the 
absolute control of a chief of ficer. But suppose that these 
captains themselves are responsible to no higher authority, and 
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moreover that they have no particular interest in communicating 
with each other. Wel l -meaning observers watching such a fleet 
manueuver might understandabl y judge the fleet to be out of control . 
They might even recommend various measures intended to enhance 
control of the fleet' s operation. Yet each commanding of f icer 
would greet such recommendations with skepticism; looking about 
his ship he sees no evidence of lack of control. 
Like the individual ships in the preceding analogy the 
parts of the federal bureaucracy typicall y  are well -behaved in 
the sense that they are responsive to the captains in the 
congressional committees and subcommittees which determine their 
fates. But the whole of the bureaucracy is out of control, as 
. c 5is ongress. 
Thus, the second distinction is that between coordinated 
and uncoordinated control, or l ess pejoratively, centralized and 
decentralized control. When I state that the Congress controls 
the bureaucracy I use the term in the second sense. Congress 
controls the parts, but there is l ittle coordination in such 
control. Particular congressional committees control the 
agencies they want to in the manner they want to. Those who view 
"control of the bureaucracy" as a problem, however, have central ized 
or coordinated control in mind: how can the disparate parts of 
the bureaucracy be integrated, how can they be made to work in 
harness to achieve major policy goals? 
This question I take it is the concern of this afternoon's 
session. In the body of this paper I will discuss at greater 
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length the current situation -- to what degree is the bureaucracy 
out of control and what can be done about it? Central to this 
discussion is a consideration of the incentives of the interested 
parties: the Congress, the president, the bureaucrats, and the 
el ectorate. Who � exert influence? To what end do they wish to 
do so? What kind of control will result? Answers to these questions 
provide a basis for speculating about the value of various suggested 
"reforms. " In a nutshell I will argue that the Congress has the 
power but not the incentive f or coordinated control of the 
bureaucracy, while the president has the incentive but not the 
power. This mismatch between the incentives and capabilities of 
the relevant political actors is at least as important as 
inf ormational overload, imbalance in expertise, and the internal 
processes of bureaucracies in expl aining the absence of coordinated 
control of the federal bureaucracy. 
II. CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY IN THE LAST QUARTER OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Where Coordinated Control Breaks Down 
As indicated in the overview I am skeptical about the 
necessity of new procedures f or achieving coordinated control over 
the bureaucracy. All necessary powers presently exist. Among 
academics this claim is not terribly original, but for the 
benefit of nonacademics and academics holding al ternative positions 
I will briefly review the basis for the claim. Simple models or 
idealizations of our political order will serve as the vehicle. 
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Assume that a new president were to take of f ice with a 
l arge and reliabl e congressional majority, a majority which he 
could depend upon to rubber stamp his legisl ative program and 
budget. This president would first appoint his people to every 
political executive post not covered by Civil Service, With few 
exceptions agencies must clear proposed l egislation with OMB. 
There, the president's people could make sure that all new 
proposal s were consistent with the administration' s grand design. 
With these steps the f uture operation of the bureaucracy is brought 
under some control. Meanwhile, in formulating the budget, OMB 
coul d bring existing programs under presidential control by 
starving those f ound to be inconsistent with his program, or in 
extreme cases by having Congress abolish agencies and/or programs. 
By assumption the Congress approves all such requests as well as 
the budget and proposed legislation.
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In this simpl e world the bureaucracy could be out of 
control onl y because mistakes are made, mistakes of program 
conception, or mistakes in administration. Perhaps there is 
simply too much proposed new legislation, or too little time to 
review existing programs. Still,  such mistakes would be unlikel y 
to persist f or very long; rather, ol d mistakes would be remedied 
and new ones would become apparent. There would be no chronic 
cases of out of control programs or agencies. For in such a 
world any outright opposition could be broken. Programs could be 
abolished, agencies reorganized, executives fired, civil servants 
transferred, etc. All this f rom the assumption of a cooperative, 
compliant Congress. 
7 
Ah, you may say, Congress is not a rubber stamp. Congress 
makes more than marginal adjustments in the president's program and 
budget. So, let us assume a more active legislative body. Rather 
than rubber stamp the president's requests, we now presume that the 
president's budget is submitted to a powerful Appropriations 
Committee, and that his program is submitted to powerful legislative 
committees. Let us assume moreover that the authorizing committees 
have jurisdiction over all aspects of a policy question (other than 
appropriations), that such committees are representative of the 
membership of the whole chamber, and that the individuals who serve 
on such committees have as their primary goal the f ormulation of 
eff iciently-administered, effective national policy. For good 
measure let us also presume that a powerful party leadership 
consciously coordinates the work of the authorizing, revenue­
raising and revenue-expending committees, and the individual members 
heed the party position because they believe in it and because their 
f ortunes are tied to it. 
In this more complicated world I submit that again there 
would be little or no problem with out of control bureaucracy. 
The president and the Congress would each f ormulate coherent programs. 
Undoubtedly, these would dif f er in some respects, and in compromising 
the two, some incoherence might result. But the assumption of 
common party af f iliation should exert a reasonably tight constraint 
on the amount of irrationality which creeps into the process. 
By this point my readers may be giggling. Ah, they 
say, that' s just not the U. S. Congress you're describing. Committee 
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jurisdictions are a "crazy quilt" -- Congress is no place f or the 
compulsively neat person. The recently passed energy policy, f or 
example, was worked over by f ive diff erent House standing committees, 
then run through an unprecedented ad hoc committee. Moreover, 
congressional committees are anything but representative. The 
Westerners head f or Interior, f arm district representatives f or 
Agriculture, urban Representatives f or Education and Labor and 
Banking and Currency etc.
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This self-selection bias is then 
exacerbated by observance of reciprocity: the country boys on 
Interior will keep their noses out of Housing matters, if the city 
boys on Banking and Currency will do the same f or public lands.
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Suddenly, even common party membership is not suf f icient to insure 
reasonable agreement between the program of the president and the 
programs of the congressional committees. And the worst is yet to 
come. 
Implicit in the notion of reciprocity is the admission 
that congressmen do not have as their primary goal the f ormulation 
of good national policy. That is a secondary goal; policy which 
benefits the district (and thereby reelection chances) is the 
primary goal. Consider two policy alternatives in some specific 
area. Policy X provides $100 in net benefits to each of districts 
1 to 400, and costs districts 401-435 $1000 each. Policy Y 
provides districts 401-435 with net benefits of $1000 each but costs 
districts 1-400 $100 each. In terms of national net benefits the 
policies rank as follows: 
Policy x: (400 X $100) - (35 X $1000)




A president might understandabl y support policy alternatives l ike x; 
if you want to make an omelet, you' ve got to break some eggs. And 
Congress? Typicall y  the representatives of districts 401-435
control the committee which chooses between X and y. By enabling
special interest congressmen to gain control of their area of special 
interest, reciprocity insures that more policies like Y will be 
chosen than would otherwise be the case. And given that we are a 
l arge heterogeneous country, all congressmen are special interest 
congressmen in some areas. Thus, reciprocity makes it possible f or 
a relatively greater number of policies like y to defeat policies 
l ike X than would be the case under simple majority rule.
When we see a public agency spending inordinate amounts 
of public f unds to pave over certain congressional districts we are 
not observing an out of control agency. We are observing an agency 
which is paying off the congressmen who nurture it. The federal 
agencies exist in a symbiotic relationship with the congressional 
committees and subcommittees to which they report. Of course, not 
everything an agency does is of concern to its set of relevant 
congressmen. It purchases its f reedom in such areas by playing ball 
in the areas which are of concern. So, part of the agency is 
typically out of control, but Congress wants it that way. It is a 
necessary cost of maintaining a bureaucracy suff iciently unconstrained 
(in l aw and by its nominal l eaders) that it is permeable to 
congressional influence. 
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What do sunset laws (SSL) and zero-based budgeting (ZBB) 
do in such a case? Little, really. Oh, on occasion they might 
force consideration of some overlooked program which no longer has 
any conceivable rationale. But basicall y, such procedural innovations 
will onl y shift more of the burden of proof f rom Congress to the 
bureaucracy, and thus make it easier for congressmen to extort 
f avors from the bureaucracy. If that's what you mean by control 
of the bureaucracy, fine. 
The f oregoing is a rather f orceful statement, a statement 
subject to many qualifications. But in broad outline I' ll stand 
behind it. If one is concerned about control of the bureaucracy 
the critical questions do not revolve around the l egal instruments 
of control. These exist and are used regularl y. The critical 
questions revolve around the f act that the Congress and the president 
do not want to control the bureaucracy f or the same ends. The 
goal s of the typical president and the goals of the typical 
congressman differ considerably. As a consequence what they want 
f rom the bureaucracy dif f ers. And therein lies the problem. 
The Ends of Control 
Put most simply, the goals of the president lead him to 
prefer centralized or coordinated control of the bureaucracy, whil e 
the goals of congressmen lead them to f avor decentralized, or 
uncoordinated control . And given that the Congress is in a somewhat 
stronger position than the president vis-a-vis the instruments of 
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control, decentralized control will prevail. 
What are the goals of the typical president? Reelection 
comes most immediately to mind, at least to the cynical mind. But 
place in history is a close second. The incumbent has already 
achieved the highest office possible; the only thing left is 
retirement as a revered elder statesman. Fortunately for analytical 
purposes the two goals often appear to be consistent. The president 
is the nation's chief official and responsible for major policy 
directions. He will presumably attain reelection as well as a 
prominent place in the history books by successfully solving 
important national problems: attaining peace with honor, stoking 
up a sluggish economy with a disgraceful rate of unemployment, 
cooling down a runaway economy with a cruel rate of inflation, 
ending crime in the streets, achieving racial equality, etc. 
Naturally there are times (as former President Nixon so of ten 
reminded us) when the short-run bullet must be bitten to achieve 
long-run goals, times when reelection and place in history pull the 
president between them (e. g. energy policy circa 197 7 ). But even 
when his goals are not completely consistent the fact remains that 
the president will desire to do something, to accomplish broad 
policy ends. He will not be content to sit in office and react to 
each specific problem or situation which arises. And in order to 
accomplish broad policy goals the president must control the 
executive branch. Many of the Nixon administration's more original 
shenanigans were at least in part attempts to harness elements of 
the federal bureaucracy which were not under control of the 
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Administration. As representative of all the people the president 
desires centralized control of the bureaucracy, whether to construct 
the national coalition he needs to win reelection or to make the 
major policy initiatives which will insure his place in history. 
Congressmen are in a different situation. Most of them 
simply wish to stay where they are, although House members are 
always on the lookout for a stray Senate seat, and increasing numbers 
of senators find personally compelling reasons to offer themselves 
as presidential candidates. With a few exceptions place in history 
is an unrealistic goal for congressmen. Each Representative is a 
paltry one vote of 435. Unlike the president he can not credibly 
claim responsibility for putting the economy back on its feet or 
healing the wounds of the civil war. At best several generations 
may remember him as the person who brought many sewage treatment 
plants to the district. Senators are in a somewhat better position, 
but even so they are merely one vote of one hundred, and how many 
twentieth century Senators can plausibly be said to have achieved 
. 1 . h' ?9 a prominent p ace in istory. No, for congressmen life is in the 
here and now. (Especially for representatives -- "now" is literally 
"now" -- their lives are organized into two year cycles. ) For 
congressmen the primary goal is figuring out how to survive the 
next election. 
And survive they do! Since the Second World War about 
90 percent of all incumbents have chosen to run for reelection and 
on average 90 percent have succeeded. Moreover, they have been 
getting even more successful in recent years.10 How have they 
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managed given that traditional partisan sources of support have been 
eroding, and public cynicism toward government institutions and 
incumbents has been increasing? Elsewhere I have argued that the 
key to this puzzle is a mid-century change in the congressional role.11 
As the scope of the federal government has expanded the federal 
bureaucracy has enjoyed a concomitant expansion. Citizens in turn 
"enjoy" increasingly more opportunities to interact with their 
federal public servants, whether in an effort to take advantage of 
various federal programs or to evade various federal regulations. 
The congressman finds himself ideally situated. Traditionally, if 
one is having problems with the bureaucracy one writes his 
congressman. The latter has a long history of intervening in 
bureaucratic decision-making for the benefit of constituents. With 
the expansion of the federal role the congressman's role as an 
intervenor an ombudsman -- has become more important. Objectively 
there is a greater demand for his services, and sensible incumbents 
have done little or nothing to stem that demand. In fact, some 
representatives, particularly the more junior ones, have actually 
stimulated the demand for ombudsman services, seeing such activities 
as a means to reach those individuals in their districts who would 
otherwise oppose them on policy, ideological, or party grounds. In 
short, congressmen are increasingly deemphasizing their role as 
formulators of national policies, which are, after all, controversial, 
and emphasizing their role as ombudsmen who strike fear in the hearts 
of incompetent or arbitrary bureaucrats. Citizens in turn 
increasingly ignore the congressman's position on major national 
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policies. What does it matter if he's a conservative or liberal, 
Republican or Democrat? He can't make much of a difference given 
that he holds only one vote out of 535.  But as subcommittee 
chairman or ranking minority member of such and such he's been a 
whiz at helping us get sewage treatment plants, mass transit 
feasibility studies, or what not. Moreover, he kept the old coke 
ovens from being shut down by EPA and tracked down 'umpteen hundred 
lost social security checks. Why give up the seniority and 
experience he's built up just because you disagree with him on the 
B-1 or revision of the Hatch Act? 
How have congressmen managed to carry out ombudsman 
act1vities so successfully? Simple. Congress has powerful 
instruments of control over the bureaucracy, and there is ample 
evidence that the threat of those instruments is seldom far from 
bureaucratic minds.
12 
The effectiveness of those instruments is 
made all the more real by the establishment and maintenance of the 
elaborate committee-reciprocity system already mentioned. Each 
congressman is given the opportunity to exercise disproportionate 
influence over segments of the federal bureaucracy which are of 
special concern to him. If an agency is causing particular problems 
for his constituents a congressman need not organize a coalition of 
51 or 218 members to discipline that agency. He need only get 
four or five subcommittee colleagues to see things his way. And 
given those facts one can hardly blame an agency for paying special 
attention to "suggestions" from an interested congressman. 
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The Congress has had a standing committee system for quite 
some time, of course (upwards of 150 years), but the major trend of 
the twentieth century has been a decentralizing one.
13 
First, the 
party leadership lost power to the committee leadership, then more 
recently the committee leadership lost power to the subcommittee 
leadership. All of this has occurred under the guise of democratic 
"reforms" to be sure. But we should not forget that the impact has 
been one of ever-increasing division of the power to control the 
bureaucracy. The House under Czar Reed could and probably did 
exert coordinated control over a small federal executive. The 
House under Tip O' Neill and 175 subcommittee chairmen still can 
coordinate the activities of a much larger bureaucratic establish-
ment, but it won't. Reed was willing to lose back-benchers who 
were forced to support locally unpopular party positions 
of the game. Today there are no back-benchers. 
The Current Situation and the Immediate Future 
breaks 
The status quo in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century is not comforting. The citizen increasingly finds himself 
in contact with a bureaucratic establishment, usually federal, or 
at least federally stimulated. This bureaucratic establishment 
is somewhat unresponsive as bureaucracies are wont to be; at times 
it may be downright capricious. And every day it seems to extend a 
little further into the citizen's life. But whether in the right 
or in the wrong the citizen knows that he can count on one powerful 
ally in his attempts to triumph over bureaucratic procedures and/or 
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dictates: his congressman. Increasingly the citizen views the 
congressman as a powerful, benevolent friend in an ever more 
threatening, impersonal world. Citizens get favors, congressmen 
get votes. 
Meanwhile down in Washington, Congress maintains a federal 
bureaucracy deliberately organized to make it permeable to 
congressional intervention -- not only to the chamber as a whole, 
but to subgroups and even individuals. So long as an agency 
cooperates when congressmen make specific requests it is unlikely 
to suffer long-term losses no matter how poor its performance. 
In fact, the more inefficient and/or unreasonable its performance 
the greater the political resource it constitutes. Not completely 
tongue in cheek, one could say that if OSHA did not exist, Congress 
might find it necessary to invent it. 
And the President? Poor fellow, he is something of the 
odd man out. His personal appointees become the captives of the 
subgovernments they were appointed to control. 14 He finds himself 
circumscribed at every step. In the first flush of victory throwing 
a net around "runaway" agencies addicted to cement pouring seems 
like a fine idea. But then Congress 'tells him that he can forget 
about a national energy policy if he doesn't learn to keep his nose 
out of where it doesn't belong. To achieve his goals the President 
must actively use a coordinated bureaucracy to achieve some positive 
purpose. But to achieve their goals congressmen can increasingly 
do no more than fend off perceived bureaucratic assaults on their 
constituents. This asymmetry would put the president in a weaker 
position than Congress even if his formal powers were comparable.
15 
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The described state of affairs has several important 
consequences for the operation of the federal government in the 
forseeable future. First, in terms of organization and administration 
we can expect more of what we've got in the way of inefficient, "out 
of control" bureaucracy. For Congress has no electoral incentive 
to work toward coordinated control. Quite the opposite. Congress 
is making increasing use of instruments which keep the bureaucracy 
more closely tied to increasingly decentralized congressional control: 
the congressional veto, "come into agreement" requirements, and 
sunset provisions. I think it is probably accurate to say that 
we are currently experiencing an increase in uncoordinated control 
and a decrease in coordinated control. Moreover, the dynamics of 
current trends have a self-perpetuating aspect. The more that 
congressmen are perceived as and elected as ombudsmen, the greater 
their incentive to maintain the current system, and the greater their 
reluctance to agree to proposals which would make major changes in 
the direction of coordinated control. 
Second, in terms of policy, we can identify certain 
biases which arise from conflicting presidential and congressional 
goals. A president may look fondly on proposals to replace the 
jerry-built structure of income security programs with a guaranteed 
annual income accomplished entirely through the tax laws. Or 
perhaps he might contemplate razing the educational grant structure 
and implementing a voucher system. In theory such programs carry 
the promise of alleviating gaps and conflicts in the existing 
program structure while requiring smaller administrative apparati 
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and allowing greater individual freedom of choice. They are naturals 
for presidents on the prowl for places in history. Congressmen have 
a different bias. Even if such massive program shifts resulted in 
no net changes in their constituents' welfare (admittedly an unlikely 
possibility), they would decrease the political resource base of 
congressmen. If benefits are distributed automatically, constituents 
will expect them as their due and not treat them in part as the 
gift of benevolent congressmen. And if costs are imposed 
automatically, as with the collection of taxes, fewer citizens will 
seek the aid of the congressmen in efforts to avoid those costs. 
In essence, congressional goals encourage a bias toward 
programs with a New Deal cast. Use the bureaucracy to regulate 
and subsidize and deliberately leave room for arbitrary 
(i.e. politically determined) decisions. Avoid general income 
redistribution; permit it to happen only as a by-product of a 
congeries of federal programs. If at all possible avoid revenue 
sharing; it's too easy for the locals to forget who gives them the 
money. Of course, we should consider the possibility that the 
congressional biases are preferable to the presidential biases. 
Thos e interests vested in existing programs think so. I' 11 leave 
this question hang since I hope to deal with it in a succeeding 
16 paper. 
Finally, in terms of political responsibility, we can 
expect the continued abdication of that responsibility by the U. S. 
Congress. Theodore Lowi has provided a compelling analysis of the 
problem.
17 
Elected officialdom delegates power to the bureaucracy 
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and provides vague or nonexistent standards for the exercise of that 
power. Again the persistent theme appears. The bureaucracy can be 
out of control only because those charged with the responsibility 
to control it choose not to. Why do they so choose? Lowi's 
diagnosis of the cause of the problem is more controversial. He 
sees the roots in acceptance of a public philosophy which exalts 
flexibility over uniformity and dependability, a philosophy which 
holds that every problem should be bargained and brokered rather 
than settled according to a fixed rule of law. Perhaps. But 
why should this philosophy have such a hold on our decisionmakers? 
Lowi blames a generation of pluralist social scientists who laid 
the intellectual groundwork in the classrooms of academia. That is 
rather heavy stuff for a discipline which has been remarkably 
irrelevant to the conduct of political affairs. Still, ideas may 
take hold where we least expect. 
Again, I think a more satisfactory explanation lies in the 
goals held by individual congressmen. They adopt a public 
philosophy based on pluralist tenets (or appear to adopt that 
philosophy) simply because it rationalizes what their political 
self- interest dictates. Peter Woll makes the case nicely: 
A major reason for the power of the bureaucracy in policy 
formulation is the frequent lack of congressional 
incentives to adhere to the Schechter rule and establish 
explicit standards for administrative action. This is 
particularly true in the regulatory realm, an area 
involving political conflict that legislators often wish 
to avoid. Congress is always willing to deal rhetorical1=Y, 
with problems requiring regulation and with the area of 
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regulatory reform, but real decisions on the part of the 
legislature will undoubtedly raise the ire of powerful 
pressure groups on one side or the other that are affected 
by government regulation.
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Why take political chances by setting detailed regulations 
sure to antagonize some political actor or another? Why not require 
an agency to do the dirty work then step in to redress the 
grievances which result from its activities? Let the agency take 
the blame and the congressman the credit. In the end everybody 
benefits. Congressmen successfully wage their campaigns for 
reelection. And while popularly villified, bureaucrats get their 
rewards in the committee rooms of Congress. 
A public philosophy which holds that the bureaucracy should 
be granted the flexibility to deal with complex issues may seem 
to be the best way for an assembly of generalists to make public 
policy in a postindustrial society. But the entire justification 
of the committee-reciprocity system rests on the specialized 
expertise it purportedly fosters. Can we have it both ways? Can we 
afford to have it both ways? 
III. SOME UNLIKELY PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Postwar political science has been slow to embrace 
proposals for change in our federal institutions. For example, prior 
to the internal fracturing of the congressional seniority system in 
the early 1970s professional students of Congress probably were 
more united in defense of that system than any other subgrouping of 
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the population, save perhaps old congressmen. And today, campaign 
"reform" proposals are far more controversial within our ranks 
than among the informed public. Radicals in our midst charge 
us with reactionary defense of the status quo, whether as an 
unconscious by-product of concern with scientific standards, or 
as a conscious result of more sinister motives. Such theories are 
hardly necessary to explain the anti-reform bias of our discipline. 
History provides us with a distressingly long list of reforms which 
have failed to solve the intended problems, created new ones, and 
produced unanticipated side-effects. Our hesitancy to support 
reform reflects our uncertainty about the eventual consequences; 
perhaps the devil that we know is better than the one that we don't. 
In this paper I have expressed skepticism about the 
consequences of currently fashionable concepts like ZBB and SSL. 
My skepticism in no way implies approval of the existing situation. 
In fact I like ZBB and SSL. They are better than nothing, but I 
believe their impact will be marginal rather than major. 
If we really want to work for coordinated control of the 
bureaucracy, we should be prepared to think big. For example, if it 
were possible to make one change in our federal institutions I'd 
suggest that we consider replacing the single member district system 
with a list system of proportional representation, treating the entire 
country as a single district. To elaborate, in every election each 
party would put up a list with a presidential and vice presidential 
candidate, 100 senatorial candidates and 435 representative candidates. 
Citizens would cast a single vote for the party of their choice. If 
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one party got 55 percent of the vote, it would get the presidency, 
the first 55 candidates on its senatorial 1ist, and the 
first 239 candidates on its representative list. The impact of such 
a reform, of course, would be to bring the goals of presidents 
and congressmen into closer agreement. To a much greater extent 
than presently both the president and congressional candidates 
would depend for election and reelection on the party's national 
record compiled over the same time period. 
Of course, major change in the electoral rules is 
politically improbable and constitutionally almost impossible. 
Additionally, it might create a multiparty system and numerous 
other by-products. Changing the electoral system is probably the 
least likely and most risky of the conceivable alternatives. 
A less radical means of bringing congressional and 
presidential incentives into closer agreement could be accomplished 
within the existing electoral structure by superimposing a responsible 
party system on it. I am familiar with the reasons why such a 
system would not be "good" for the United States. 19 I only remind 
the doubters that we approximated such a system in the last years 
of the nineteenth century and first years of the twentieth. Can it 
be demonstrated that the country is governed better today than it 
was then? 
I do not have the slightest hope that we could bring about 
a resurgence of responsible party government. Party bonds in the 
electorate are progressively weakening -- an irreversible trend in 
the view of some scholars.
20 And candidates increasingly have 
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divorced themselves from party organizations, an option which owes 
its attractiveness at least in part to the existence of decentralized 
control of the bureaucracy.
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Advocating a responsible party system 
at this time is akin to advocating a strengthening of the presidency, 
which is another possibility we might consider. 
Who has the incentives to exercise coordinated control of 
the bureaucracy? The president. Ergo, to increase such control 
we should consider ways to strengthen his hand vis-a- vis the Congress. 
Scholars of the presidency are much like French generals in their 
capacity to overlearn the lessons of history. After working under 
Franklin Roosevelt they spent t wo decades expounding the virtues of 
strengthening the presidency. Now, following the tragedy of Vietnam, 
the revelations of Watergate, and precedents for those excesses, 
d . 'd 
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everyone sees great angers in a strong presi ency. 
intellectual even-handedness would be desirable. 
A bit more 
At any rate, given recent history and the attitudes formed 
in reaction to it, advocates of a stronger presidency are unlikely 
to meet with much success. I find it difficult even to sketch the 
lines along which the Presidency might be strengthened. Congress 
will not give up its existing powers. Thus, if we strengthen the 
ties between the presidency and the bureaucracy, we are more likely 
to increase stalemate than coordinated control. Recall too the 
fundamental asymmetry: to achieve his goals the president must take 
positive action, whereas congressmen can do well enough by reacting 
and blocking. 
Finally, we have the unlikely alternative of strengthening 
the Congress -- as an institution, not as an agglomeration of 400 
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odd subcommittees and committees, amorphous parties and weak 
institutional leaders. The bureaucracy is subject to decentralized 
control because the Congress itself is so decentralized. Increasingly, 
the individual members can achieve their primary goals independently 
of, even in opposition to, the ends for which the institution was 
created. As Fenno wryly notes, we see candidates running for Congress 
by running against Congress.
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What can we do to harmonize the 
desires of the individual members for reelection and the integrity 
of the institution as a democratic, policy-making assembly? 
The trick involves making the fate of individual members 
more dependent on institutional performance and less dependent on 
their personal efforts.
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One possible change would be to assign 
members to committees randomly, for a maximum tenure of say, four 
25 years. This innovation would curb the present practice of allowing 
congressmen proportionately greater influence in areas of special 
concern to their districts. It should reduce the number of policies 
and programs' which exploit a large part of the country (e. g. 
consumers) for the benefit of narrowly based interests (e. g. shoe 
manufacturers). Less able to play the role of district ombudsman, 
the congressman would have little other choice than to play the role 
of national legislator. He could only hope that if his colleagues 
did the same they all might come out okay. Of course, we would have 
to sacrifice the system of specialization which exists, but I regard 
it as a fair price to pay. 
In the past a great deal of imagination has gone into 
proposals for the reform of Congress. I hope that imagination still 
25 
exists. For in the final analysis an out of control bureaucracy 
reflects an out of control Congress. We might just as well avoid 
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